Examining the South China Sea Disputes by Hiebert Murray;Nguyen Phuong;Poling Gregory B.;

Author:Hiebert, Murray;Nguyen, Phuong;Poling, Gregory B.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 4206490
Publisher: ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD

The statement did not, however, mention any countries by name.

Australia’s defense minister, Kevin Andrews, also used the Shangri-La Dialogue to make clear his government’s “opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions to change the status quo in the South and East China Sea [including] any large scale land reclamation activity.”7 And Canberra demonstrated its unhappiness by inviting Japanese troops to the annual U.S.-Australian Talisman Sabre military exercise. In both 2014 and 2015 Australia also took part in the annual U.S.-Philippines Balikatan exercises. Australia is about to transfer two tank landing craft to the Philippines.

Completing the triangle, the Philippines and Japan held their first-ever joint naval exercises in the South China Sea in mid-May 2015, following an agreement between the two countries signed in January.8 Japan is delivering 10 patrol ships to the Philippine coast guard and committed to upgrade Manila’s surveillance and defense capacities. In June the two countries formalized their strategic partnership.9

India has grown more involved too. In September 2014 an India-U.S. joint statement specifically mentioned the South China Sea for the first time. President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi called for the resolution of the territorial and maritime disputes, “in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including UNCLOS.”10

India has ignored Chinese objections and again invited Japan to take part in its annual Malabar naval exercises, with the United States, in October 2015. India, Japan, and the United States will also hold their trilateral dialogue at the ministerial level for the first time on the sidelines of the 2015 East Asia Summit. There are also separate India-Japan naval exercises.

All around the region, security arrangements that used to be characterized as hub and spoke—with the United States as the hub—are also becoming peer-to-peer networks. Australia, India, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam, and others are gradually building new, direct security and diplomatic relations with each other. There are some exceptions—only the “I” in BRICS has spoken, for example—but almost every other major country has, directly or indirectly, criticized China’s island building and made specific calls for the principles of UNCLOS to be applied.11

This brings us to The Hague, Netherlands, and the Palace of Peace—the seat of the Permanent Court of Arbitration—where the first hearings in the Philippines’ case against China were heard in early July 2015.12 The tribunal first has to decide whether to hear the case, which is really a question of whether it thinks that the territorial disputes need to be resolved before it can make a ruling based on UNCLOS about what kind of maritime zones can be claimed from each feature. Assuming the tribunal decides to hear the case—and it would be surprising if it does not—then the Philippines can be expected to win on almost every count.

Of the seven Chinese-occupied features in the Spratlys, four contain rocks that remain above water at high tide and three would be submerged in their natural state. Neither they nor Scarborough Shoal can support human habitation. Therefore they generate a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, at best, and absolutely no exclusive economic zone (EEZ) at all.

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